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1. Introduction  
According to the theory of compensating wage differentials, competition between firms equalises 
the overall value of employment packages for a particular type of occupation [Rosen (1986)]. 
Thus, one would expect jobs that offered minimal fringe benefits to offer high wages, and vice 
versa.  
The theory of compensating wage differentials has been tested, with mixed results, on a 
variety of such benefits: health insurance [Olson (2002), Currie and Madrian (1999)]; maternity 
benefits [Gruber (1994)]; work-related injury and sickness insurance [Gruber and Krueger 
(1991)]; paid vacation leave [Altonji and Usui (2007)]. In contrast, relatively little empirical 
work has been undertaken on the compensating differential between wages and pensions, 
particularly on UK data. The empirical evidence that does exist is somewhat mixed - see Table 1 
(Appendix). For North America, compelling evidence of a trade-off is found by Smith (1981), 
Clark and McDermed (1986), Moore (1987), Montgomery, Shaw and Benedict (1990), 
Gunderson et al. (1992). Less compelling are the findings of Ehrenberg (1980), Schiller and 
Weiss (1980) and Bulow and Landsman (1985). No evidence of a trade-off is found by Smith 
and Ehrenberg (1983) or Mitchell and Pozzebon (1986) whilst significant positive relationships 
are found by Gustman and Steinmeier (1987), Dorsey (1989) and Even and Macpherson (1990).  
In terms of the UK, Inkmann (2006) finds evidence of a perfectly compensating wage 
differential using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). Andrietti and 
Patacchini (2004) find evidence to support the implicit contract argument that male occupational 
pension participants employed in the private sector earn a positive wage premium only at the 
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beginning of their career. However, once they account for the endogenous sorting of individuals 
into occupational pension schemes, the magnitude decreases sharply.
2
 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between wage and pension benefits using 
data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and derived prospective pension rights 
variables as calculated by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS). We find no evidence of a trade-
off, even after accounting for possible sample selection bias. 
This paper is set out as follows: Section 2 sets out the legislative background to pension 
schemes in the UK whilst Section 3 discusses the theory of compensating differentials, 
examining in particular the remuneration trade-off in between current pay and future promised 
pension benefits. Section 4 outlines our data and empirical methodology. Our results are set out 
in Section 5 and final comments are collected in Section 6. 
2. Background  
2.1 Occupational Pension Schemes in the UK
3
 
All UK Employees who earn more than the ‘Lower Earnings Limit’ (LEL – currently £5304 per 
year) are automatically enrolled in the ‘State Second Pension’ (S2P), the earnings-related tier of 
the UK public pension system. Employees may choose to join an employer provided 
occupational pension scheme, either in conjunction with or instead of the S2P. The latter option 
is termed ‘Contracting-Out’ and reduces the employee’s National Insurance (NI) contributions to 
the S2P. Employers are not obliged to offer an occupational pension scheme, and employees are 
                                                 
2 Studies that analyse the trade-off tend to adopt either a ‘spot’ or ‘life-cycle’ approach. The former approach focuses on pension 
benefits that have been accrued up to a particular point in time, looking at the value of pension benefits that a particular employee 
is enjoying in a particular year. The latter approach utilises assumptions regarding salary growth to calculate prospective benefits 
that may accrue over an individual’s life-cycle. Whilst Inkmann (2006) and Andrietti and Patacchini (2004) find trade-offs using 
life-cycle approaches, it has been uncommon to find such a trade-off from a spot approach. 
3 For more detailed descriptions of the UK Pension environment, see Blake (2003), Cocco and Lopes (2004), and Banks et al 
(2005). The following section draws heavily from Inkmann (2006). 
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not required to join such a scheme if it is offered. If they do so join, then employees are able to 
claim income tax relief on their total contributions (up to a limit of 15 per cent of gross earnings) 
to any occupational pension scheme that is deemed ‘exempt approved’. Higher employee 
contributions are explicitly prohibited in exempt approved schemes but corporation tax relief is 
given on employer contributions without an upper bound. Also a tax-free lump sum payment 
may be received at retirement age from an exempt approved scheme.  
Employers are required to contribute a minimum of 10 per cent of the sum of employee 
and employer contributions to exempt approved schemes. Although employee contributions are 
not compulsory for exempt approved schemes, most employers set mandatory contributions as a 
precondition for scheme membership.  
There are two main types of exempt approved schemes, ‘Defined Benefit’ (DB) and 
‘Defined Contribution’ (DC). The former defines a pension related to the members’ salary (or 
some other value) preset in advance, whereas the latter is a pension based on the contributions 
made and the investment return that they have produced. Employees may augment mandatory 
scheme contributions by Additional Voluntary (AV) and / or Free-Standing (FS) contributions. 
AV contributions may be used to purchase additional years of service for DB schemes or may be 
paid into a DC scheme offered by the employer. FS contributions are paid into an externally 
provided DC scheme. 
2.2 Calculating Pension Benefits 
Because individuals place a higher value on income received sooner than later, the value of a 
pension is usually defined as the discounted present value of the stream of pension income 
received from the date of retirement to death [see, for example, Disney et al. (2007a, 2007b 
2009)]. What this implies for DB and DC pensions is examined below. 
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The Value of a Defined Benefit (DB) Pension 
The annual income received from a final salary DB pension will depend on a measure of ‘final’ 
salary, an accrual fraction and the length membership in the scheme vis: 
t t tp n y  (1) 
pt  denotes annual pension income from normal pensionable age (NPA), a  denotes the fraction 
of accrual, nt  denotes years of membership up to year t and yt  denotes the member’s ‘final’ 
salary.
4
 Gross pension wealth at time t, wt , is defined as the present discounted value of the lump 
sum plus this stream of pension income:
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where   denotes the real intertemporal discount factor, r the number of years to retirement, T 
the year of member’s death and Tp the year of partner’s death (if this is later than Tp). Expression 
(2) assumes an exponential discount function and, for simplicity, we follow Disney et al. (2007) 
in assuming a constant discount rate of 2% such that d = 1+ 0.2( )
-1
= 0.8 ¢3 . 
The marginal benefit of remaining in the scheme for an extra year will be greater the 
longer the member expects to receive the pension income for (i.e. the longer is the period from 
retirement, r, to death of the member, T, or partner, Tp ). This accrual is shown in expression (3): 
 (3) 
                                                 
4 Most DB schemes also provide lump sum payments upon reaching NPA in addition to a stream of pension income until death. 
Where scheme rules apply, a proportion of the pension income will continue to be paid to the partner of the member, as 
survivor’s benefits. If an employee leaves the scheme early and defers taking a pension until NPA, then the annual pension 
income that they will receive from NPA will depend on the salary they received when they left up-rated by the Retail Price Index 
(RPI). Beyond NPA, the pension received is also increased in line with inflation each year. 
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where c denotes the employee contribution rate and Dy º yt+1 - yt  The marginal value of 
remaining in a final salary pension comes both from the extra year of accrued service and the 
higher final salary used to calculate the pension for all previous service. The marginal value 
therefore depends fundamentally on the number of years of service, n.  
The Value of a Defined Contribution (DC) Pension to Members  
In a DC pension plan, contributions, c, from the employee and employer are placed each year 
into a fund. This fund will then grow over time as a result of additional contributions and 
investment returns, x, until the date of annuitisation when the employee chooses to withdraw the 
pension, at which time an annuity is purchased (at rate ρ) that provides an annual income until 
death (at time T) – see Disney et al (2009). The value of a DC pension is thus the discounted 
present value of the stream of pension income that will be received from the date of annuitisation 
until death. In return for this extra stream of pension income, the employee gives up some 
proportion, c, of his current salary. The value of an additional year’s pension accrual is therefore: 
Dw = d s
s=r
T
å Dbt+1 - ¶cyt+1 (4) 
where Dbt+1 º bt+1 - bt = cryt+1 1+ x( )
r-1
, ρ denotes the indexed annuity rate, δ the real 
intertemporal discount factor, x the real investment return, c the employee contribution rate and 
c  the combined employer and employee contribution rate. 
The discounted present value of the wealth therefore depends on the annuity rates 
available when the individual purchases the annuity, and on the prior level of contributions 
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invested and investment returns.
5
 The utility derived from contributing to a DC pension scheme 
is more complicated, because it depends on factors such as the annuity rate and the member’s 
age at birth, but in general the greater the investment return, x, the more beneficial is the DC 
scheme.
6
 
Risk Allocation versus Monetary Reward 
The benefits of an occupational pension can be split into two categories: First, insurance, 
especially against outliving savings; and second, the tangible monetary value of the pension 
provided. By changing the scheme rules and/ or structure of the pension scheme, it is possible to 
change the risk allocation, thereby increasing the level of insurance offered to the employee. For 
example, by offering an indexed pension, the employer is providing additional risk allocation 
against inflation. 
Additionally, schemes may alter their rules to encourage or discourage the retention of 
employees. This may be done by changing accrual rates, early retirement rules or maximum 
service requirements to name a few examples. It is possible to change the structure of the 
pension scheme (i.e. whether it is DB or DC) so as to re-allocate the risk between the employer 
and employee. The extremes of this spectrum are a final salary DB scheme, where the majority 
of risks are borne by the employer, and a money purchase DC scheme, where the employee bears 
most of the risk. There is substantial body of research into how the structure of occupational 
pension schemes influences the recruitment and retention of employees [see, for example, 
Andrietti and Patacchini (2004), Disney and Whitehouse (1996), Gustman and Steinmeier, 
                                                 
5 This dissertation follows Disney’s et al (2007b) assumption that the annuity rates that will be available when the individual 
annuitises will be the second-best currently available age and sex-specific individual life annuity rates. As quoted by the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) on 13 March 2007 on the basis of a £100,000 fund, www.fsa.gov.uk/tables. The assumption 
used of investment return that individuals receive on their pension funds is real 2 ½ per cent a per year. 
6 There is an important interaction between the investment return, x, and the discount factor, d r( ) . If d r( ) 1+ x( )r >1 then the 
scheme member would gain utility by investing a sum from now until time r. 
 9 
(1993), Akerlof and Katz (1989)]. It has been found that final salary defined benefit pensions are 
better at retaining employees than DC schemes. This is because employees who leave a final 
salary pension scheme will be disproportionately disadvantaged by a significant financial 
penalisation simply due to the structure of the scheme. As a result, the provision of final salary 
schemes often encourages retention in these organisations. 
3. Theoretical Underpinning 
The theory of compensating differentials implies that employees will self-select into occupations 
that offer the combination of wage and non-wage benefits that most closely match their 
preferences. Holiday entitlement, pension and other fringe benefits will therefore act as 
substitutes for direct cash wage payments in the overall remuneration package. 
Holding non-pecuniary benefits aside and focussing on the relationship between wages 
and occupational pension benefits, one would expect employees who prefer higher pension 
benefits to be paid lower wages than otherwise identical employees, and vice versa. For example, 
older workers and workers with relatively high (low) marginal tax brackets (rates of time 
preference) are likely to prefer to receive a higher portion of their remuneration as pension. It 
would also follow that a pension-wage trade off will exist between the yearly increase in 
promised pension benefits, discounted at the individual’s rate of time preference, and the direct 
current wage payment each employee receives. Figure 1 illustrates this trade-off for two 
individuals with differing marginal rates of substitution between wage and pension benefits but 
facing competitive employment packages as implied by the single isocost line. Individual 1 
(resp. 2) has a relatively higher (resp. lower) preference for pension benefits implying an optimal 
pension-wage allocation of (PB, WB) [resp. (PB, WB)]. 
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 Profit maximising firms will endeavour to recruit labour up to the point at which the 
marginal cost of employment equals the marginal revenue from employment. Under competition 
and assuming no differential effects on productivity, firms will be indifferent between wage and 
pension benefits ceteris paribus such that that the isocost line illustrated in Figure 1 would have 
a slope of -1 [see Smith (1981) and Montgomery et al (1992)]. The equilibrium market locus is 
then the function tracing out the tangencies between the individuals’ indifference curves and the 
firms’ isocost curves. Alternatively, a nonlinear market equilibrium locus may result. Nonlinear 
isocost curves might arise if there were economies of scale in the provision of pension benefits 
because of fixed costs of setting up plans. Similarly, if the pension effect on worker productivity 
was an increasing function of the level of benefits, then the isocost curves would become flatter 
as pension benefits increase In this case the slope of the equilibrium locus may lay between 0 
and -1, or may even be positive, if a pension premium exists.  
Annual Increment 
in Present Value of 
Promised Pension 
Benefits
Annual Wage
WA
WB
0                 PA PB
1
1I
1
0I
2
1I
2
0I
 
Figure 1: The Pension-Wage Trade Off 
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 The implication of all this is that the sign of a non-wage benefit variable in a correctly 
specified wage regression, after controlling for qualification and other characteristics that affect 
wages, should turn be negative. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient should be unity in 
absolute terms unless fringe benefits increase the productivity of employees, in which case the 
coefficient should be less than unity in absolute terms. 
Reasons why such a premium may exist could be either theoretical or the result of data 
misspecification. Theoretically, the existence of a pension wage premium in a static context may 
be a sign that occupational pensions are being used as a form of payment for more productive, 
higher paid employees. If pensions act as an efficiency wage and increase the productivity of 
workers, then the straightforward trade-off would not hold and premium would exist. 
Additionally, implicit contract theory also predicts higher wages in firms offering pensions of the 
DB type because firms must pay a compensating wage premium to workers who accept deferred 
wage contracts [Ippolito (1994)].
7
 A premium could also be the result of data mis-specification. 
Ippolito (1997) suggests that any compensation schemes that emphasize occupational pensions, 
can select in high quality workers via a sorting effect. If this were the case, then it would not be 
the efficiency wages pushing the premium, but the unobservable individual heterogeneity 
earnings capacity characteristics, (i.e. superior job performance) of occupational pension 
participants. 
                                                 
7 The premium is required because workers in long-term contracts forgo some opportunities for higher paying jobs in their career. 
This specifically applies to final salary DB occupational pension provision where the ‘pension loss’ on quitting is potentially 
much higher. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
Data 
Analysis on pensions is hindered by a lack of individual level data containing information on 
accumulated pension entitlements attached to other covariates of interest. Two exceptions for 
UK data are the British Retirement Survey (BRS) and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
(ELSA). Both of these are, however, only representative of older individuals (55 to 69 years in 
the BRS and 50 years and over in the ELSA) and are therefore not informative of the behaviours 
of the majority of working age individuals. 
Our data are derived from waves 2 to 11 of the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) 
covering the period 1991-2001. The BHPS allows for the analysis of both a larger and cross 
sector sample of working individuals than is possible from either the ELSA. We restrict our 
sample to employed individuals below the age of 68 years, excluding those who report usual 
yearly gross earnings below £4000 or above £200000 in order to avoid outliers. Based on these 
criteria, an unbalanced panel is created with a total of 50771 observations. Summary statistics of 
all the variables used are set out in Table 3 (Appendix). 
Methodology 
Our empirical methodology is based on the estimating framework proposed by Schiller and 
Weiss (1980) to test for a compensating wage differential. Consider a standard Mincer-Becker 
type wage regression of the form: 
lnW = b0 + b1S + b2E + b3E
2 +e  (5) 
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where W is gross labour income, the error term e , S denotes the individual’s years of schooling 
and E denotes experience. Schiller and Weiss (1980) add employer provided fringe benefits, F, 
to the left hand side of the regression, arguing that it is the total benefit package that should 
matter to compensate the employee’s productivity potential - the theory of compensating 
differentials suggests that, given productivity, any granted fringe benefits will be compensated 
by a corresponding wage differential. With f = F/W, the regression equation (5) may be 
transformed:  
ln W 1+ f( )éë ùû = b0 + b1S + b2E + b3E
2 + e
Þ
lnW = b0 + b1S + b2E + b3E
2 - ln 1+ f( )+ e
Þ
lnW = b0 + b1S + b2E + b3E
2 +g f + e
 (6) 
Since ln 1+ f( ) » f  for small f, it is possible to test the theory of compensating differential 
between wages, W, and fringe benefits, F, with the hypothesis that: 
H
0
: g = -1  (7) 
In this analysis, the fringe benefit that needs to be measured is the benefit of remaining in the 
pension scheme for an additional year, vis. the yearly increment in pension benefit. Inkmann 
(2006) initially used employer contribution rates as an estimation of this value. This is arguably a 
superior measure of pension benefits than the binary nature of a simple pension coverage 
variable as used, for example, by Andrietti and Patacchini (2004) because it incorporates depth 
of the pension provision into the analysis. The drawback of using the employer contribution rate 
as a proxy for pension benefits is that in DB schemes the rate is based on both the current 
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benefits for an individual employer and the paying out of current payments to pensioners. A 
projective pension variable is generally considered to be preferable. Inkmann (2006), for 
example, uses such projected calculations in his preferred regression results where a trade-off is 
found.
8
 In what follows, we use the calculated projected rights as computed by Disney et al 
(2007) - see Table 1 following:
9
 
 2% discount rate 
 Age-earnings profiles computed from each education/age group using Family 
expenditure survey 
 All DC schemes- employer contribution 4.6% + match employee + fund growth 2.5% 
 Private sector DB schemes – 1/60th accrual rate with a NPA of 65 
 Public sector DB scheme – 1/80 accrual rate plus 3/80 lump sum with a NPA of 60 
 All individuals are assumed to live until their age and sex specific life expectancy 
Table 1: Assumptions used in Disney et al (2007) to compute private pension wealth variable 
Our pension variables are calculated using the actual projected method of valuing pensions, 
encapsulating what has already been accrued in the current year and, as such, more likely to 
determine recruitment and retention, rather than looking at the whole life-cycle possibilities of 
the employee. 
5. Results 
All Workers 
Preliminary investigation of our data revealed that most of the variables exhibited between 
effects that were larger than those of within effects. This would suggest that there is more 
variation across individuals than there is within individuals. We therefore estimated our panel 
regression through a random effects random model, the results of which are set out in Table 3 
(Appendix). 
                                                 
8 Contributions are often set by actuaries to meet certain funding requirements that the scheme has to meet. Changes in the 
funding ratios will affect contributions but will have no effect on the individuals pension benefit. By calculating prospective 
variables this problem is avoided. 
9 These derived BHPS variables are publicly available through the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) data archive. 
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The results from the standard Mincer-Becker type regression equation (5) are set out in 
column (1) of Table 3 and appear to accord with a priori expectations: higher qualification levels 
are associated with higher gross pay and experience increases pay at a decreasing rate. All 
variables are statistically significant at the one per cent interval. 
The annual accrued pension variable, f, is included in our second regression, set out in 
column (2), which also controls for ethnicity, union membership and gender. The estimate of g , 
the coefficient of the ratio of annual accrued present value pension rights to the gross wage, is 
0.04, which would appear to reject the theory of compensating differentials. The finding of a 
premium between pension benefits and pay does not, however, entirely negate hypothesis (7). 
The theory is traditionally applied for a given level of productivity, but it is possible that fringe 
benefits may distort behaviour. For example, workers receiving fringe benefits may work more 
productively and thus earn higher wages than other workers ceteris paribus.
10
 There may also be 
econometric reasons why the trade-off does not hold. Altonji and Usui (2005) recount the ‘sorry 
story’ for compensating differential studies. More often than not, findings contradicting the 
theoretical expectations are explained by an omitted variable bias triggered by insufficient 
observable information on ability. Currie and Madrian (1999) provide further discussion on this. 
 In our specification, the education, qualification and experience variables are all 
imperfect measures of general and firm specific capital. If the associated measurement error is 
positively correlated with the fringe benefit variable, then an OLS estimator of the fringe 
benefits’ variable’s coefficient, γ, will be biased upwards and may eventually switch sign from 
negative to positive. Inkmann (2006) is aware that when testing for the occupational pension 
                                                 
10 Askildsen and Ireland (2003) review possible sources of productivity gains: pension benefits may be used to protect 
investments in firm specific human capital [see Johnson (1996)], to reduce shirking through the deferred wage characteristic for 
pension benefits [see Akerlof and Katz (1989), Curme and Kahn (1990)], and to attract the desired type of employee by offering 
the particular wage and fringe benefit compensation package this type of employee is likely to expect. 
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compensating wage differential, there is an opportunity to test this measurement error. If the 
gross pension accrual variable is broken down into the component from the employer and the 
employee, then it may be possible to identify such an error. 
We follow Inkmann’s (2006) approach by creating a measure of employee contributions, 
C, from a question in wave 11 of the BHPS that asked respondents what percentage of their 
salary they contribute into their employer’s pension scheme. Given the obstinacy of most 
pension arrangements, we assume that this percentage is the same across the other waves. We 
then restructured our original wage equation, calculating gross salary, net of these employee 
contributions (Y = W - C). 
 
ln Y +C( ) = b0 + b1S + b2E + b3E
2 + g f + e
Þ
ln Y 1+ c( )éë ùû = b0 + b1S + b2E + b3E
2 + g f + e
Þ
lnY = b
0
+ b
1
S + b
2
E + b
3
E2 + g f +j c + e
 (7) 
where c = C/Y such that the (pure) theory of compensating differentials would imply γ = ϕ = -1. 
Column (3) in Table 3 sets out the results from this regression. The estimate of γ at 0.08 is still 
not negative but that of  , with a value of –1.07, is much closer to –1 and more in line with the 
theoretical prediction. 
If there were a measurement error in the education and qualification variables, then it 
would be difficult to argue that the error is correlated with employer provided benefits to the 
pension scheme but not correlated with the employee contributions [Inkmann (2006)]. From 
looking at these results, we gain some assurance in the methodological structure of the 
regressions used. 
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One would expect the relationship between wage and pension benefits to depend to some 
extent on the nature of the pension provision. DB pension schemes allocate more risk to the 
employer and the nature of their financing makes it harder to adjust the compensating wage 
differential for every given employee’s productivity potential. In DC provision, where accrual is 
more transparent and where the employer does not need to worry about financing in the same 
way, adjusting the trade-off for each employee should be more possible. There should therefore 
be a greater trade-off under DB provision rather than DC provision because, ceteris paribus, DB 
provision provides more non-monetary risks.  
Wave 11 of the BHPS provides information on the type of employer pension provision. If 
we assume that the type of employer pension remains stable across other waves, it is then 
possible to decompose f into 
 f = f
DB + f DC  such that: 
 
lnY = b
0
+ b
1
S +b
2
E +b
3
E2 +g
1
f DB +g
2
f Dc +j c+e  (8) 
Results from this regression are set out in column (4) of Table 3 and continue to show a wage-
pension premium for both DB and, although to a lesser extent, DC schemes. 
Public Sector Workers 
An interesting and hitherto unaddressed issue is the nature of the wage-pension relation amongst 
public sector workers. Public sector employment in the UK is generally more secure than private 
sector employment and one might anticipate that those individuals who select themselves into 
public sector employment are more risk averse than their private sector counterparts. How these 
factors impact on the trade-off is illustrated in columns (5)-(8) of Table 3 where we apply our 
regression analysis to a restricted sample of public sector employees. The results from our 
underlying Mincer regression are set out in column (5) and those from our basic wage-pension 
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regression, which focuses only annual pension benefits, are set out in column (6). The latter 
suggests a larger premium at 0.06 than that found for the whole sample. Incorporating employee 
contributions into our analysis makes very little change to the coefficient on the pension benefit 
variable, but employee contributions do exhibit a much smaller trade-off than for the whole 
sample – see column (7). The results from decomposing the type of pension provision into DB 
and DC are set out in column (8) and reinforce our previous findings that DB provision is related 
to a slightly higher premium than DC provision. 
Our results for public sector should be interpreted with caution since attitudes towards 
risk may affect both the preferred trade-off between pensions and wages and preferred 
employment. Individuals who are risk averse may prefer to maintain more money in the form of 
a pension in order to save for an uncertain future or they may prefer to increase their current 
holdings of cash. And the same type of individuals may also be attracted to the security of public 
sector employment, ceteris paribus. To account for potential sample selection bias, we adopt the 
Heckman (1976) two-step estimation procedure using the inverse Mills’ ratio. We follow Hersch 
and Viscusi (1990), Hersch and Pickton (1995), Viscusi and Hersch (2001) and Brown et al. 
(2006) in proxying risk averseness by a variable detailing whether or not the respondent smoked. 
The underlying probit set out in Table 5 shows that public sector individuals are significantly 
less likely to smoke than other workers, ceteris paribus. The significant Mills ratio suggest that 
sample selection bias is an issue but the adjusted regression results, set out in Table 4, do not 
show significant change for the coefficients of interest from the previous analysis. 
Given the failure of previous empirical work to find conclusive results of a relationship 
between pay and pensions, it is unsurprising that similar results are found in this case. It appears 
that rather than a small trade-off, there is in fact a very small premium effect. This means that for 
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every unit increase in the pension: wage ratio there is a (small) increase in associated pay. The 
reverse is also true, if the pension: wage ratio is reduced it does not appear that this automatically 
leads to higher pay levels. There is a slightly higher premium, 0.06 in the public sector than the 
whole sample, 0.04. However once employee contributions are deducted the premium is smaller 
than for the whole sample. 
6. Final Comments 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between wages and pensions payments using data 
from the BHPS and derived prospective pension rights variables as calculated by the Institute of 
Fiscal Studies (IFS). We find no evidence of a trade-off in either the public sector or the 
complete workforce, even after accounting for possible sample selection bias. The coefficients 
for the pension: wage ratio variables are very small suggesting that the proportion of salary that 
is paid as pension benefits to employees has little effect on explaining their wage level. There 
appears to be only marginal differences between the public and private sector labour markets and 
DC provision is associated with slightly less of a pension premium than DB. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Previous studies on the wage-pension benefit trade-off 
Study 
Country of 
Study 
Data Pension Variables Results 
Ehrenberg (1980) US Two data sets on municipal 
police, firefighters, and sanitation 
workers in the years 1973-75 
Ratio of pension benefits to earnings at time of 
retirement; employee’s contributions; measures 
of likely underfunding; other characteristics of 
pension plans 
Some evidence that increased employee contributions and underfunding lead 
to higher wages; limited evidence of wage-pension benefit trade-off (police in 
one data set); mixed results for other characteristics 
Schiller & Weiss (1980) US 1969 pension file linked with 
Social Security earnings for men 
Ratio of pension cost to wages; other pension 
plan characteristics 
Trade-off for 3 of 5 age groups, but significant only for 45-54 age; mixed 
results for other characteristics 
Smith (1981) US Government employees in 86 
cities in Pennsylvania in 1976 
Pension benefit accrual and measure of pension 
underfunding 
Significant trade-offs for higher pension benefits, and compensating wage 
premiums for risk of underfunding 
Smith & Ehrenburg (1983) US 193 firms with wage and pension 
differences across jobs of 
different Hay point job 
evaluations 
Differences in pension value across jobs of 
different Hay Scores 
No significant trade-offs 
Bulow & Landsman (1985) US 1982 data on 993 faculty at 
Stanford 
Probability of signing up for pension plan Weak trade-off, usually insignificant 
Clark & McDermed (1986) US 1971/73/75 Retirement History 
Survey, men 
Working past age of normal retirement and 
hence experiencing negative pension accruals 
Trade-off in the sense that a significant compensating wage premium is 
associated with expected pension loss from delayed retirement 
Mitchell & Pozzebon (1989) US 1696 employees, 666 with 
pension plans, from 1983 Survey 
of Consumer Finance 
Coverage by Pension plan; pension 
contributions; and other pension plan 
characteristics 
No trade-off; more often a wrong-signed relationship 
Gustman & Steinmeier (1987) US 558 full-time private sector men 
from 1983 Survey of Consumer 
Finance 
Coverage by Pension Plan Significant positive relationship 
Moore (1987) US 4500 employees from 5 firms Pension cost to employer Significant negative trade-off under 2SLS to account for the fact that pensions 
are positive function of wages in earnings-based plans; significant positive 
relationship under OLS 
Dorsey (1989) US 1973 full time private sector 
employees from 1983 Survey of 
Consumer Finance 
Coverage by pension plan. Simultaneously 
determined 
Significant positive relationship in both OLS and 2SLS, the latter to account 
for the possibility that pension coverage is a function of wages 
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Table 1 (Continued): Previous studies on the wage-pension benefit trade-off 
Study 
Country of 
Study 
Data Pension Variables Results 
Even & Macpherson (1990) US 6,317 employees with defined 
benefit plans, from 1983 Survey 
of Consumer Finance 
Coverage by pension plan Significant positive relationship 
Montgomery et al. (1992) US 529 employees with defined 
benefit pension plans, from 1983 
Survey of Consumer Finance 
Pension benefit accrual as % of wages Significant trade-off, but it becomes insignificant when 2SLS is used to 
account for simultaneity 
Gunderson et al. (1992) Canada 98 matched pension plans and 
collective agreements, Ontario 
Actuarial calculation of employer’s expected 
pension cost, and pension plan characteristics 
affecting that cost 
Significant trade-off, especially for flat benefit rate, but not for early and 
postponed retirement provisions; trade-off only when pension variable 
specified as replacement rates, not amounts 
Andrietti & Patacchini (2004.  UK BHPS, 1991-2001, restricted to 
white males 20-55, full-time in 
non-agricultural jobs 
Pension Coverage Find a premium for those in an occupational pension, but only early on in their 
career. 
Inkmann (2006) UK First wave (2002/3 of English 
Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
Pension plan tenure, employer contribution In preferred specification find evidence of perfect trade-off for wages with 
both occupational defined contribution and defined benefit pension scheme 
benefits 
Source: Updated from Gunderson et al (1992) 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 Sample 
 All Workers Public sector workers 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Male 0.5291 0.4992 0.3591 0.4798 
Age 38.76 11.49 41.15554 10.5054 
Gross Yearly wage (W) 15941 10216 16544 9278 
Yearly pension (F) 5468 10251 8232 13080 
Employee contribution (C) 1125 1132 1235 986 
Years since left education (E) 18.79 11.44 21.16 10.49 
Years in scheme membership 3.1756 6.5016 6.6218 8.4838 
Union member 0.2714 0.4447 0.5793 0.4937 
Qualification Level 1 (S1) 0.4352 0.4958 0.5978 0.4904 
Qualification Level 2 (S2) 0.3470 0.4760 0.2723 0.4451 
Qualification Level 3 (S4) 0.0804 0.2719 0.0899 0.2861 
Public Sector job 0.2582 0.4376 - - 
Private Sector job 0.6838 0.4650 - - 
Ethnicity 0.1284 0.3455 0.1428 0.3579 
DB 0.2303 0.4210 0.3994 0.4898 
     
Number of Observations 50771 13109 
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Table 3: Compensating Wage Differentials (Random Effects) 
Dependent Variable: Ln Wage 
  All Workers Public Sector Workers 
Variable Symbol (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept  
8.604 
(0.01) 
8.400 
(0.02) 
8.4467 
(0.0386) 
8.4126 
(0.0363) 
8.5938 
(0.0281) 
8.4393 
(0.0400) 
8.4822 
(0.0620) 
8.4901 
(0.0601) 
Yearly pension/Yearly wage f - 
0.039 
(0.01) 
0.0766 
(0.0068) 
  
0.0552 
(0.0061) 
0.0550 
(0.0078) 
 
 f
DC
 - - - 
0.1017 
(0.0158) 
-   
0.0419 
(0.0212) 
 f
DB
 - - - 
0.1204 
(0.0068) 
-   
0.1016 
(0.0079) 
Employee contribution/ Net year wage C - - 
-1.0740 
(0.2325) 
-1.1454 
(0.2239) 
-  
-0.4906 
(0.3153) 
-0.5186 
(0.3070) 
Years since left education E 
0.056 
(0.01) 
0.056 
(0.00) 
0.0591 
(0.0020) 
0.0649 
(0.0018) 
0.0407 
(0.0179) 
0.3941 
(0.0229) 
0.3980 
(0.0313) 
0.3843 
(0.0302) 
Years since left education squared E
2
 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.0006 
(0.0000) 
-0.0008 
(0.0000) 
-0.0005 
(0.0000) 
-0.0395 
(0.0051) 
-0.0169 
(0.0071) 
-0.0191 
(0.0070) 
Union  - 
0.072 
(0.01) 
0.0459 
(0.0072) 
0.0446 
(0.0068) 
- 
0.0929 
(0.0072) 
0.0591 
(0.0096) 
0.0677 
(0.0095) 
Ethnicity  - 
-0.049 
(0.01) 
-0.0768 
(0.0146) 
-0.0910 
(0.0132) 
- 
-0.0516 
(0.0151) 
-0.0602 
(0.0213) 
-0.0697 
(0.0211) 
Male  - 
0.413 
(0.01) 
0.3868 
(0.0224) 
0.3876 
(0.0217) 
- 
0.3319 
(0.0236) 
0.3132 
(0.0346) 
0.3059 
(0.0335) 
Qualification Level 1 S1 
0.424 
(0.01) 
0.357 
(0.02) 
0.2979 
(0.0260) 
0.2646 
(0.0245) 
0.5022 
(0.0214) 
0.4339 
(0.0304) 
0.3580 
(0.0446) 
0.3568 
(0.0439) 
Qualification Level 2 S2 
0.221 
(0.01) 
0.205 
(0.02) 
0.1328 
(0.0270) 
0.1019 
(0.0257) 
0.2651 
(0.0226) 
0.2371 
(0.0315) 
0.1719 
(0.0460) 
0.1715 
(0.0456) 
Qualification Level 3 S4 
-0.119 
(0.015) 
0.101 
(0.02) 
0.1256 
(0.0380) 
0.0840 
(0.0367) 
0.1897 
(0.0350) 
0.2837 
(0.0478) 
0.2454 
(0.0651) 
0.2253 
(0.0649) 
R-Squared  0.1354 0.1957 0.1612 0.1880 0.1081 0.1912 0.1415 0.1664 
Notes: (i) Dependent variable is log yearly gross pay (W) for columns (2-3,6-7) but net of employee contributions (Y = W - C) in (4) and (8); (i) Education; Level 2: A Levels, O levels or equivalent; Level 3: 
Commercial, Apprenticeship, CSE Grade 2-5,; Level 4: others; (ii) Standard errors in parenthesis (iv) c = C/Y = C / (W - C) and f = F / W, with yearly gross wage, W, yearly present discounted pension, F, 
and yearly employee contribution, C. 
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Table 4: Compensating Wage Differentials for Public Sector Workers Adjusting for 
Sample Selection Bias (Random Effects) 
Dependent Variable: Ln Wage 
Variable Symbol (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept  
8.5901 
(0.2413) 
8.4755 
(0.3033) 
8.9539 
(0.4130) 
8.7557 
(0.4062) 
Yearly pension/Year wage f  
0.0554 
(0.0061) 
0.0554 
(.0078) 
 
 fDC    
0.0417 
(0.0212) 
 fDB    
0.1025 
(0.0080) 
Employee contribution/ Net year wage C   
-0.5535 
(0.3169) 
-0.5659 
(0.3082) 
Years since left education E 
0.0412 
(0.0041) 
0.0388 
(0.0051) 
0.0327 
(0.0070) 
0.0344 
(0.0068) 
Years since left education squared E2 
-0.0005 
(0.0000) 
-0.0004 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002 
(0.0000) 
Union   
0.0932 
(0.0072) 
0.0592 
(0.0097) 
0.0677 
(0.0095) 
Ethnicity   
-0.0546 
(0.0157) 
-0.0671 
(0.0228) 
-0.0779 
(0.0225) 
Male   
0.3313 
(0.0236) 
0.3123 
(0.0347) 
0.3046 
(0.0336) 
Qualification Level 1 S1 
0.4999 
(0 .0747) 
0.4227 
(0.0948) 
0.2153 
(0.1309) 
0.2757 
(0.1290) 
Qualification Level 2 S2 
0.2599 
(0.0391) 
0.2312 
(0.0506) 
0.1085 
(0.0711) 
0.1346 
(0.0705) 
Qualification 
Level 3 
S4 
0.1853 
(0.0363) 
0.2807 
(0.0479) 
0.2358 
(0.0653) 
0.2172 
(0.0653) 
Lambda   
-0.0062 
(0.0537) 
-0.0830 
(0.0727) 
-0.0459 
(0.0714) 
      
R-Squared  0.1044 0.1921 0.1423 0.1663 
Notes: (i) Dependent variable is log yearly gross pay (W) for columns (1) and (2) but net of employee contributions (Y=W-C) in 
(3) and (4); (ii) Standard errors in parenthesis; (iii) Qualification: Level 1: Higher education, Level 2: A Levels, O levels or 
equivalent, Level 3: Commercial, Apprenticeship, CSE Grade 2-5, Level 4: other. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Underlying Probit Analysis for Heckman Sample Selection 
Dependent Variable: Public Sector Employment 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
Smoker -0.2872 0.0529 
lyrpay -0.0010 0.0415 
Years since left education 0.0903 0.0081 
Years since left education squared -0.0006 0.0002 
Qualification Level 1 1.8110 0.0931 
Qualification Level 2 0.7927 0.0936 
Qualification Level 3 0.0394 0.1296 
Intercept -5.4059 0.3808 
Log Likelihood -14501.62 
Chi-Squared  1229.44 
 
 
